Note - the explicit 'language based' representational code is not domain specific like the implicit 'cognitive mode' that is found in other primates, but has the domain-generality and interpenetrability that you find with 'access consciousness'; it is a general purpose representational format that is not anchored in particular implicit motive contexts (e.g. competition for food), or caching food in scrub jays (Clayton).
This intentional cognitive mode may also be much more closely associated with self-control based on normative standards - much more self-regulating in this sense, ultimately leading to the e.g. responsibility-bearing personhood, with emotions like guilt or pride, and self-esteem. Agency now has a social-normative core.
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
Implicit vs explicit goal-directed cognition
In a previous blog entry, one stage of development was
It's at this stage perhaps that the conscious, self-regulating goal-directed self, with explicit motives, can begin to peel away from the 'pre-conscious' implicit, goal-directed self, with implicit motives. The former may be left-hemisphere lateralised.
Implicit motive driven cognition may be closer to pre-verbal, primate-typical, intentional cognition, with gesturing/body language-type communication and an action-based abstract 'ontology'. With human sophistication, the grain of communication and action may be finer, fast-acting and efficient.
Explicit motive systems may be built on top of this - involving the DLPFC and anterior cingulate (?) and new motivational systems.
This may also be related to the notion of 'access consciousness' in the sense of higher level, intelligent, rational, rule-based, action/cognition that is less anchored in (and confined to) particular implicit motives and associated ecological contexts (e.g. competition for food in chimpanzees), but is more general purpose.
Language is no doubt essential to this, being a hierarchical, recursive, goal-based, representational format that is not domain specific.
It's at this stage perhaps that the conscious, self-regulating goal-directed self, with explicit motives, can begin to peel away from the 'pre-conscious' implicit, goal-directed self, with implicit motives. The former may be left-hemisphere lateralised.
Implicit motive driven cognition may be closer to pre-verbal, primate-typical, intentional cognition, with gesturing/body language-type communication and an action-based abstract 'ontology'. With human sophistication, the grain of communication and action may be finer, fast-acting and efficient.
Explicit motive systems may be built on top of this - involving the DLPFC and anterior cingulate (?) and new motivational systems.
This may also be related to the notion of 'access consciousness' in the sense of higher level, intelligent, rational, rule-based, action/cognition that is less anchored in (and confined to) particular implicit motives and associated ecological contexts (e.g. competition for food in chimpanzees), but is more general purpose.
Language is no doubt essential to this, being a hierarchical, recursive, goal-based, representational format that is not domain specific.
Types of intentionality
4 types of intentionality, in order of phylogeny and ontogeny
1. IntentionalityA (action affordance) - abstract, program level, goal directed action based, shared content with multiple agents. (As we find in monkeys and apes). 6 months to 1 year of age.
2. IntentionalityO (particulars/object based) - concrete, indexical, particular, cause-effect, predicative, with multiple knowing agents who may be motivated to share information. Developmental stage of 'shared attention' at around 14 months and later pre-linguistic 'false belief' understanding at around 2 years of age (Southgate et al. 2007). Here we perhaps have unified 'access consciousness' and a shared, public world of particulars and states of affairs in a space-time continuum. Also the idea of the 'narrative self'. Here we have the right cognitive equipment and the right sort of cognitive ontology for language learning to take off. We also have notions of possession/ownership as well as sharing at this stage.
3. IntentionalityN (normative standards based) - actions, behaviour, practices, objects, etc, meaningful in terms of 'correctness' criteria operating in a social self-regulating way. Here we find an understanding of adopting norms or correct rules in a game, etc. Starting around 3 years of age.
4. IntentionalityI (intepretative/aspectual) - here, through more sophisticated language use and a meta-representational ability, there is an understanding of different senses or interpretations of the same objective state of affairs., mediated through language Here there is ability in language mediated false belief tasks, opacity tasks, and meta-cognitive tasks. 4-7 years of age. These abilities- one might argue - are all language mediated. Here we begin to grasp full 'folk psychology' to predict and understand others.
1. IntentionalityA (action affordance) - abstract, program level, goal directed action based, shared content with multiple agents. (As we find in monkeys and apes). 6 months to 1 year of age.
2. IntentionalityO (particulars/object based) - concrete, indexical, particular, cause-effect, predicative, with multiple knowing agents who may be motivated to share information. Developmental stage of 'shared attention' at around 14 months and later pre-linguistic 'false belief' understanding at around 2 years of age (Southgate et al. 2007). Here we perhaps have unified 'access consciousness' and a shared, public world of particulars and states of affairs in a space-time continuum. Also the idea of the 'narrative self'. Here we have the right cognitive equipment and the right sort of cognitive ontology for language learning to take off. We also have notions of possession/ownership as well as sharing at this stage.
3. IntentionalityN (normative standards based) - actions, behaviour, practices, objects, etc, meaningful in terms of 'correctness' criteria operating in a social self-regulating way. Here we find an understanding of adopting norms or correct rules in a game, etc. Starting around 3 years of age.
4. IntentionalityI (intepretative/aspectual) - here, through more sophisticated language use and a meta-representational ability, there is an understanding of different senses or interpretations of the same objective state of affairs., mediated through language Here there is ability in language mediated false belief tasks, opacity tasks, and meta-cognitive tasks. 4-7 years of age. These abilities- one might argue - are all language mediated. Here we begin to grasp full 'folk psychology' to predict and understand others.
Phenomenology / intentionality
One idea - the 'content' of the monkeys shared cognitive framework (mediated via mirror neuron systems) is inherently ACTION-BASED, not object based. Agents may be individuated and perceived as particulars, but the actions - set at the 'program level' are ABSTRACT, not particular. For non-human primates the 'shared ontology' of actions may thus be an abstract ontology, not an ontology of particulars - of this or that entity here and now (referred to by indexicals - or simply pointing - with humans). The 'shared cognitive system' evolves by becoming less and less abstract and increasingly concrete and particular. With humans we can share attention/cognition on particular, concrete objects, the perceptual objects of consciousness; -these entities are not abstract (although they may be categorized in abstract ways). Once there is shared attention to concrete particulars (and not abstract program-level actions) and processes, then there is - intuitively scope for causal experimentation / manipulation - with, perhaps, a parallel in the visuo-spatial scratch pad idea of working memory.
Intentionality
Intentionality - Requires 'shared' representations - some 'language' of representational elements that are common to, mutually reinforce/constrain (and perhaps can be exchanged between) different 'cognitive systems' - the cognitive systems of different agents or individuals. It is this shared 'representational space' that grounds the 'objectivity' of the content within an 'epistemic or intentional community', and which is the basis for an awareness of different 'perspectives' (from different individuals) on that objective field or frame.
Notion of 'interpenetrability' of representations through different (agent's) cognitive systems. In imitation learning, for instance, more abstract 'program-level' action representations may be copied / exchanged between individuals. Perhaps also the following: a subordinate chimpanzee's goal directed actions may fit within a dominant chimp's goal directed action plans? We certainly see this in humans.
This can be seen in terms of the group as a whole having a self-regulating cognitive system based on shared 'intentional' representations and rules. This system - perhaps mediated by mirror neurons as a part of a more distributed frontal-parietal 'executive system' may have been 'group selected' in evolution (vs individual level selection).
Notion of 'interpenetrability' of representations through different (agent's) cognitive systems. In imitation learning, for instance, more abstract 'program-level' action representations may be copied / exchanged between individuals. Perhaps also the following: a subordinate chimpanzee's goal directed actions may fit within a dominant chimp's goal directed action plans? We certainly see this in humans.
This can be seen in terms of the group as a whole having a self-regulating cognitive system based on shared 'intentional' representations and rules. This system - perhaps mediated by mirror neurons as a part of a more distributed frontal-parietal 'executive system' may have been 'group selected' in evolution (vs individual level selection).
Intentionality and motor planning
Hypothesis: flexible, rational control over goal-directed action hierarchies has a basis in social cognition and is necessary for an intentional (Brentano-like) representational format.
Sunday, May 25, 2008
'3 Modes of cognition': linguistic, cognitive and embodied
Three hypothesized modes: 1. Language based - symbolic, public, intentional, syntactical. 2. 'Cognitive': pre-linguistic but nonetheless symbolic, abstact, discrete, intentional, hierarchical/ decomposable, and PUBLIC (with meaning and shared reference) - in part shared with ape higher cognition (goal directed, intelligent tool use, imitation learning, etc). 3. 'Embodied' - Connected, situated, dynamical (conditioning based, or affordance based), and non-intentional (in the philosophical sense).
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