Phenomenology / intentionality

One idea - the 'content' of the monkeys shared cognitive framework (mediated via mirror neuron systems) is inherently ACTION-BASED, not object based. Agents may be individuated and perceived as particulars, but the actions - set at the 'program level' are ABSTRACT, not particular. For non-human primates the 'shared ontology' of actions may thus be an abstract ontology, not an ontology of particulars - of this or that entity here and now (referred to by indexicals - or simply pointing - with humans). The 'shared cognitive system' evolves by becoming less and less abstract and increasingly concrete and particular. With humans we can share attention/cognition on particular, concrete objects, the perceptual objects of consciousness; -these entities are not abstract (although they may be categorized in abstract ways). Once there is shared attention to concrete particulars (and not abstract program-level actions) and processes, then there is - intuitively scope for causal experimentation / manipulation - with, perhaps, a parallel in the visuo-spatial scratch pad idea of working memory.