Access consciousness and language

Note - the explicit 'language based' representational code is not domain specific like the implicit 'cognitive mode' that is found in other primates, but has the domain-generality and interpenetrability that you find with 'access consciousness'; it is a general purpose representational format that is not anchored in particular implicit motive contexts (e.g. competition for food), or caching food in scrub jays (Clayton).

This intentional cognitive mode may also be much more closely associated with self-control based on normative standards - much more self-regulating in this sense, ultimately leading to the e.g. responsibility-bearing personhood, with emotions like guilt or pride, and self-esteem. Agency now has a social-normative core.

Implicit vs explicit goal-directed cognition

In a previous blog entry, one stage of development was

It's at this stage perhaps that the conscious, self-regulating goal-directed self, with explicit motives, can begin to peel away from the 'pre-conscious' implicit, goal-directed self, with implicit motives. The former may be left-hemisphere lateralised.

Implicit motive driven cognition may be closer to pre-verbal, primate-typical, intentional cognition, with gesturing/body language-type communication and an action-based abstract 'ontology'. With human sophistication, the grain of communication and action may be finer, fast-acting and efficient.

Explicit motive systems may be built on top of this - involving the DLPFC and anterior cingulate (?) and new motivational systems.

This may also be related to the notion of 'access consciousness' in the sense of higher level, intelligent, rational, rule-based, action/cognition that is less anchored in (and confined to) particular implicit motives and associated ecological contexts (e.g. competition for food in chimpanzees), but is more general purpose.

Language is no doubt essential to this, being a hierarchical, recursive, goal-based, representational format that is not domain specific.

Types of intentionality

4 types of intentionality, in order of phylogeny and ontogeny

1. IntentionalityA (action affordance) - abstract, program level, goal directed action based, shared content with multiple agents. (As we find in monkeys and apes). 6 months to 1 year of age.

2. IntentionalityO (particulars/object based) - concrete, indexical, particular, cause-effect, predicative, with multiple knowing agents who may be motivated to share information. Developmental stage of 'shared attention' at around 14 months and later pre-linguistic 'false belief' understanding at around 2 years of age (Southgate et al. 2007). Here we perhaps have unified 'access consciousness' and a shared, public world of particulars and states of affairs in a space-time continuum. Also the idea of the 'narrative self'. Here we have the right cognitive equipment and the right sort of cognitive ontology for language learning to take off. We also have notions of possession/ownership as well as sharing at this stage.

3. IntentionalityN (normative standards based) - actions, behaviour, practices, objects, etc, meaningful in terms of 'correctness' criteria operating in a social self-regulating way. Here we find an understanding of adopting norms or correct rules in a game, etc. Starting around 3 years of age.

4. IntentionalityI (intepretative/aspectual) - here, through more sophisticated language use and a meta-representational ability, there is an understanding of different senses or interpretations of the same objective state of affairs., mediated through language Here there is ability in language mediated false belief tasks, opacity tasks, and meta-cognitive tasks. 4-7 years of age. These abilities- one might argue - are all language mediated. Here we begin to grasp full 'folk psychology' to predict and understand others.

Phenomenology / intentionality

One idea - the 'content' of the monkeys shared cognitive framework (mediated via mirror neuron systems) is inherently ACTION-BASED, not object based. Agents may be individuated and perceived as particulars, but the actions - set at the 'program level' are ABSTRACT, not particular. For non-human primates the 'shared ontology' of actions may thus be an abstract ontology, not an ontology of particulars - of this or that entity here and now (referred to by indexicals - or simply pointing - with humans). The 'shared cognitive system' evolves by becoming less and less abstract and increasingly concrete and particular. With humans we can share attention/cognition on particular, concrete objects, the perceptual objects of consciousness; -these entities are not abstract (although they may be categorized in abstract ways). Once there is shared attention to concrete particulars (and not abstract program-level actions) and processes, then there is - intuitively scope for causal experimentation / manipulation - with, perhaps, a parallel in the visuo-spatial scratch pad idea of working memory.

Intentionality

Intentionality - Requires 'shared' representations - some 'language' of representational elements that are common to, mutually reinforce/constrain (and perhaps can be exchanged between) different 'cognitive systems' - the cognitive systems of different agents or individuals. It is this shared 'representational space' that grounds the 'objectivity' of the content within an 'epistemic or intentional community', and which is the basis for an awareness of different 'perspectives' (from different individuals) on that objective field or frame.

Notion of 'interpenetrability' of representations through different (agent's) cognitive systems. In imitation learning, for instance, more abstract 'program-level' action representations may be copied / exchanged between individuals. Perhaps also the following: a subordinate chimpanzee's goal directed actions may fit within a dominant chimp's goal directed action plans? We certainly see this in humans.

This can be seen in terms of the group as a whole having a self-regulating cognitive system based on shared 'intentional' representations and rules. This system - perhaps mediated by mirror neurons as a part of a more distributed frontal-parietal 'executive system' may have been 'group selected' in evolution (vs individual level selection).

Intentionality and motor planning

Hypothesis: flexible, rational control over goal-directed action hierarchies has a basis in social cognition and is necessary for an intentional (Brentano-like) representational format.

'3 Modes of cognition': linguistic, cognitive and embodied

Three hypothesized modes: 1. Language based - symbolic, public, intentional, syntactical. 2. 'Cognitive': pre-linguistic but nonetheless symbolic, abstact, discrete, intentional, hierarchical/ decomposable, and PUBLIC (with meaning and shared reference) - in part shared with ape higher cognition (goal directed, intelligent tool use, imitation learning, etc). 3. 'Embodied' - Connected, situated, dynamical (conditioning based, or affordance based), and non-intentional (in the philosophical sense).

Detachment

Hypothesis: the more flexible cognitive control needed for the use of communicative gestures and language emerges - on one plausible account - with a dampening of emotional/motivational reactivity - related to activation of the limbic system and the amygdala perhaps. Similarly - and this is the hypothesis - this may be required for the ability to perceive objective states of affairs and their causal relationships: to adopt a 'rational stance' with respect to both mental and physical dynamics perhaps. Evidence for the former - Buttelmann et al.'s Encultured chimpanzees imitate rationally 2007 paper. In the wild they do not, while Orangutans do - why. The authors suggest: "orangutans are calmer and more observant than chimpanzees, or less governed by a need to get food rewards as directly as possible."

"Adult humans understand...that actors perceptually monitor the overall situation asthey pursue their goals, and choose plansof action that fit the opportunities andconstraints of the current situation; that is to say, they understand others' intentional actions rationally". This ability may exist in humans as young as 12 months. This is what Orangutans also seem able to do in the wild, and enculturated chimpanzees can do too!

Mirror neurons

I think that what has sparked so much excitment with mirror neurons is the fact that they respond to the actions of others - the meaningful actions of others - in a social context. They direct attention to the individual embedded in a social context which in cognitive psychology is rare.

satisfaction and correctness

I think there is a useful distinction to be drawn between these two types of ‘intentionality’ – the first is a type of ‘satisfaction’ condition, the lattera type of ‘correctness’ condition.

Type A.

Desire - satisfied/dissatisfied
Goal - attained/unattained
Problem - solved/unsolved
Competition - won/lost
Question - answered/unanswered
Task - completed/incomplete
Difficulty - resolved/unresolved
Fact - established/not established
Theory - confirmed/disconfirmed
Understanding - attained/unattained

And so on.

Type B

Belief/statement - true/false
Reasoning - valid/invalid
Behaviour - appropriate/inappropriate
Action - rational/irrational
Game playing - correct/incorrect
Object - valuable/worthless
Performance - good/bad
Action - moral/immoral
Institution - just/unjust
Situation - fair/unfair

Question: Do these regulative criteria/judgements develop together: is there a common developmental root?

Cognitive competences related to theory of mind.

On the theory I've been develeping over the past year, there is the following progression of abilities: association > hidden cause tracking (may involve basic simulation) > normative standard 'content'/ intentionality > aspectual perspective taking > normative standard (deep) perspective taking.

It is only when we get to the aspectual perspective taking at around 6 years old that we get real 'theory of mind' on this view.

Normative standard intentionality is something that is not domain-specific to 'minds': it is externalist with respect to multiple domains - behavioural, mental, action, social practice, objects, tools, etc.

mental simulation and particulars

Mental simulation/mental modeling - an aspect of causal reasoning - requires the representation of particulars, located in space and time as unique individuals.

Emergent consciousness

Gell-Mann in this talk suggests that the human mind, like life itself, could be emergent - a product of laws and accidents. In the case of the human mind it could be an emergent property of the complexity of neo-cortex. The cerebellum - which is not involved in conscious awareness - has the same neuron density, but is not as interconnected as cortex: it is not as complex. I think the idea that consciousness is an emergent 'global' property is a more plausible than the ideathat it is a module, an exaption, an assembly and so on.

Gell-Mann's TED talk: http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/view/id/194

In the moment

Hypothesis: the following competences develop together, perhaps around the 2nd year -

1. Ownership judgements.
2. A sense of autobiographical continuity through time.
3. Indexicality.
4. Exploratory causality-related manipulation of objects.

The intuition behind this is that here we see a sense of 'being in the conscious moment' - a moment that extends through autobiographical time.